

**Converging Aristotelian Faculties:
A Note on *Eth. Nic. VI xi 2–3* 1143a25–35.**

(2) *Ἐἰσι δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτὸ τείνουσαι* 25 λέγομεν γὰρ γνῶμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνῶμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἥδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ 29 κριτικός ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετός καὶ εὐγνώμων ἡ συγγνώμων· τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. (3) *ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά· καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνῶμη περὶ τὰ 34 πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα.* (4) *καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ . . .* VI xi 2–4

The structure of book VI of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is not pellucid. The general purpose of the book is to define the concept of practical wisdom or *φρόνησις* and the method by which Aristotle attempts to reach his aim is that of contrasting practical wisdom with other seemingly relevant concepts. The main contrast here, underlying the book as a whole, is that between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom (*σοφία*) or 'science' (*ἐπιστήμη*).

Another, less general, contrast is the one drawn in chapters ix–xi, from which the above quotation is taken, between practical wisdom and a series of three fairly specific states of knowledge, or capacities: excellence in deliberation (*εὐβουλία*, ix), 'understanding' (*σύνεσις*, x) and 'judgement' (*γνῶμη*, xi 1). These are *practical* abilities and hence are closely connected with practical (as opposed to theoretical) wisdom but they are not *identical* with that type of knowledge. The exact way in which they differ from practical wisdom is left somewhat in the dark, but it is possible, I believe, to see them as distinguishing *parts* of the total state of knowledge which is practical wisdom. However that may be, in this note my aim is to discuss the textual details of the quoted passage, in which Aristotle tries to argue the essential connectedness of those practical abilities.

The passage follows immediately on his analysis of excellence in deliberation, of understanding and of judgement, but in spite of his initial statement, in 1143a25, to the effect that 'all the states', *viz.* that have been considered, are closely connected, in his actual argument (1143a26 ff.) for the connection he leaves out excellence in deliberation and instead includes intuitive reason (*νοῦς*): it is not clear why.

The thesis he presents himself as arguing for in the passage is that the four abilities he thus ends up with, *viz.* judgement, understanding, practical wisdom and intuitive reason (1143a26), 'converge to the same point'. The sense of this rather strange phrase is presumably, as one may gather from the argument he appends for his thesis, that the abilities mentioned may be seen to 'converge' towards each other, or to 'tend' towards being one and the same ability, for the reason that they are concerned with the same *objects*, *viz.*, as Aristotle's argument shows, particulars or objects of practice.¹

But how, then, are we to understand his argument for that thesis? The text, as it stands, seems to contain more than one difficulty. All looks well until (a29) *καθ' ἕκαστον*, but after that the difficulties multiply: (1) What is the point of (a29) *μὲν*? Does anything correspond to it,

¹ For an expression of a similar relationship, between understanding and practical wisdom, see 1143a6–8.

and if so what? (2) All translations I know of and the familiar division into paragraphs of the Greek text, which stems from Karl Zell,² suggest that a new idea is being introduced at (a32) *ἔστι δέ*; but what, then, is the new point contained in that sentence (*ἔστι δέ—τὰ πρακτά*)? (3) How does (a33) *καὶ γὰρ—ἔσχατα* (a35) *explain* (witness *γὰρ*) the preceding sentence?

Some commentators have been worried, others have not. Ramsauer (408–9) discusses the first and third difficulties. He takes the contrast to (a29) *μὲν* to be (a35) *καὶ ὁ νοῦς*, but thinks that Aristotle, when he comes to discussing *νοῦς*, has forgotten about the contrast he intended to draw. As regards the third difficulty, Ramsauer deletes (a33) *τὰ πρακτά*, thus making (a33) *ἅπαντα* take up (a28) *πᾶσαι . . . αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ*, but he offers no explanation of how the supposed corruption occurred. Greenwood (203–4) is dissatisfied with Ramsauer's suggestions concerning (3), but does not come out clearly with anything better. More recent commentators have not been worried.

I now wish to suggest one fairly simple change in the text that would seem to remove the three difficulties listed. The new text may, of course, contain drawbacks unnoticed by me: that is for others to determine.

The text I suggest runs:

Ἐἰσι δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτὸ τείνουσαι λέγομεν γὰρ γνῶμην καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ νοῦν ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνῶμην ἔχειν καὶ νοῦν ἥδη καὶ φρονίμους καὶ συνετοὺς. πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. <καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνῶμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα,> καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικός ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος, συνετός καὶ εὐγνώμων ἡ συγγνώμων (τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον), ἔστι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἅπαντα τὰ πρακτά. [καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνῶμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἔσχατα.] καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα· καὶ γὰρ . . .

Restructuring Ross's translation and changing it in a few places, I render the new text thus:

'Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be expected, to the same point. For when we speak of judgement and understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding.

² I refer to the following books by author's last name only: J. Cook Wilson, *On the Structure of the Seventh Book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Chapters I–X* (Oxford 1879; 1912 reissue with a postscript on the authorship of the parallel versions); F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*, 'Aristoteles, Werke . . .', ed. E. Grumach, vi³ (Darmstadt 1964); R.-A. Gauthier et J.-Y. Jolif, *Aristote, l'Éthique à Nicomaque*² (Louvain/Paris 1970); L. H. G. Greenwood, *Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book Six* (Cambridge 1909); D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III*, (Oxford 1968); R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Cambridge 1907); W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1912); P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen I, (Peripatoi ed. Moraux, v: Berlin/New York 1973)*; G. Ramsauer, *Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea* (Leipzig 1878); H. Rössow, *Forschungen über die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles* (Weimar 1874); G. Rodier, *Aristote, Traité de l'âme* (Paris 1900); W. D. Ross, trans. of *Eth. Nic.* in *The Works of Aristotle . . . ix* (Oxford 1925); *id.*, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford 1961); J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1892); W. Theiler, *Aristoteles, Über die Seele*, 'Aristoteles, Werke . . .', ed. E. Grumach, xiii (Berlin 1959); A. Torstrik, *Aristotelis De Anima* (Berlin 1862); Carolus Zell, *Aristotelis Eth. Nic. libri X* (Heidelberg 1820).

For all these faculties deal with ultimates and particulars. For (1) (a) not only must the man of practical wisdom know these, but (b) understanding and judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates, and (2) (m) being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned (for equity is common to *all* good behaviour—towards other people³) but (n) all things to be done *are*, in fact, included among particulars and ultimates.⁴

So construed, lines 229–35 contain two distinct arguments for the thesis that the three faculties of practical wisdom, understanding and judgement deal with ultimates and (=i.e.) particulars and hence (*cf.* a28 γὰρ) may properly be said to ‘converge to the same point’. As for intuitive reason, a separate argument is appended in a35 ff. to show that it, too, deals with ultimates and hence, we should infer, *does* belong among the converging faculties, as was stated in a26 and 27.

The two arguments are:

(1) (a) Practical wisdom *does* deal with particulars (as has already been stated, see, e.g., 1141b15, 1142a14 and 24), and (b) as for understanding and judgement, (i) they deal with things to be done, and (ii) things to be done are particulars, (hence (iii) understanding and judgement also deal with particulars).

(2) (m) People of understanding and judgement are concerned with the objects of practical wisdom, but (n) all things to be done (and these things are identical with the objects of practical wisdom) are particulars, (hence (x) the man of practical wisdom and (y) people of understanding and judgement are concerned with particulars).

By adding one premiss under (2) (n) (for which see 1141b16, b12 and, in general, VI v) we thus obtain two acceptable arguments for Aristotle’s thesis.

However, having got so far one cannot fail to notice that the two arguments, though not completely identical, are indeed very similar: did the text originally contain them both?

Well, if the proposed change is correct (and I shall assume it to be so, since I believe it to be the simplest change that will render the text coherent), then we shall have to account for the corrupt tradition: what could explain that the correct order of the two arguments has been reversed? The simplest explanation is, I believe, that originally the text did *not* contain both arguments: one is an addition, which was inserted in the wrong place when a copy was made of the manuscript in which it made its first appearance as a marginal or interlinear note.

Assuming that the simplicity of this explanation warrants its truth, we should try to answer the question it raises as to the chronological order of the two arguments: which is the original one and which was added and at a later stage inserted in the wrong place? Two considerations tend to show that it is the second argument (a29, καὶ ἐν-τὰ πρακτά, a33) that was added and hence that the

³ I take the point of this difficult sentence to be that the objects of judgement, *viz.* equitable acts (τὰ ἐπιεικῆ), are coextensive with all *good* acts, although only those that involve *other* people—i.e. with all *just* acts; hence judgement itself and men of good or sympathetic judgement are properly said to be concerned with the objects of practical wisdom (albeit only in relation to other people), which is what the sentence is intended to prove. Commentators disagree on the precise relation between this sentence and the preceding one (what is Aristotle trying to prove?), and on the gender of τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων (masculine or neuter?). The answers to these two questions that are implied in the proposed interpretation are, for the former question, that of Dirlmeier (465), and for the latter, that of Stewart (ii 90–91).

text originally ran . . . πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις ἀπαι τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ’ ἔσχατα.

First, it makes sense, on grounds of content, that somebody should have wanted to add the second argument to the first one, but not vice versa, since the second can be seen to improve on the first in at least two respects. (1) Where the first just *asserts* that practical wisdom deals with particulars, the second presents a small *argument* to the same effect; and (2) where the first treats (a) practical wisdom separately from (b) understanding and judgement and, under (b), makes no fine distinctions between understanding and judgement, the second distinguishes between understanding and judgement (in so far as it carefully argues, in (a31) τὰ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ-πρὸς ἄλλον (a32), for the assertion that the man of judgement, no less than the man of understanding, is ‘able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned’) and explicitly identifies the objects of understanding and judgement as being those of practical wisdom, hence connects, by argument, the three faculties involved.

Secondly, content apart, it is easier to imagine somebody mechanically inserting the second argument in the wrong place, than to imagine him adding the first argument, keeping a γὰρ, which is now superfluous, in the added first argument, and removing from the second, original, argument a γὰρ (between μὲν and τῶ) which must have been there for the original text to have made sense.

I conclude that considerations both of content and of explanatory simplicity favour the view that originally the text contained the first argument only, and that the second argument is an addition that was at some stage inserted in the wrong place: before the first one instead of after.

Who, then, was the person who made an additional note of the second argument, and who was the person who inserted it into the text in the wrong place? Short of a revelation we shall never know, but it is at least a reasonable guess that these were in fact different people and that the former was Aristotle himself while the latter was some editor of his text.⁴

If this is correct, one may ask whether Aristotle, in making the note, wished the final text to contain both arguments (but presumably in the order according to

⁴ This suggestion, which must remain a suggestion only, should be seen against the background of the general problem of parallel passages in Aristotle, and this problem in its turn belongs under the historical problem of the genesis and transmission of the Aristotelian texts. The problem of parallel passages was brought into focus by Torstrik (1862), in connection with the *De Anima*, and Rasso (1874), in connection with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The wider problem of the character of our received text was clarified by Jaeger’s remarks, in his dissertation on the *Metaphysics* (1912), on the genre and original purpose of an Aristotelian text (Jaeger 131–48) and by the later discussion of the question of what happened to the text between the moment it left Aristotle’s hands and the moment when it had found its final expression in the manuscripts as we have them. For a summary of this discussion see, e.g., Moraux (1973) 3–94. From the very start of scholarly debate concerning these questions there has been agreement about the framework within which they should be seen: we have (a) Aristotle himself writing and possibly adding to his written text; (b) an editor, piously or not so piously, putting together whatever material was available to him, and finally (c) the scribes mechanically copying the received text (compare, e.g., Rasso 49–51). How to divide the text within that framework is a matter of continued debate. Work relevant to the discussion of parallel passages in the *Ethics*, apart from Rasso’s, is that of Cook Wilson (1912) and the edition of Gauthier and Jolif (1958–9), whose translation reflects a reorganised text that well summarises earlier observations on parallel passages and other textual inconcinnities.

which the second follows the first) or whether he wanted the second one to *replace* the first one. No answer to this question is immediately obvious. On the one hand, the arguments Aristotle offers for a thesis often *are* similar one to another; hence he may well have wanted our text to contain both arguments. On the other hand, where a given argument is completely absorbed into another, in such a way that no idea contained in the former is absent from the latter, while the latter makes additional points, it is perhaps more likely that the latter was seen by Aristotle as a substitute to the former. And this may fairly be said to hold of the first and second arguments of our text. In that case, the editor should have proceeded in this way: faced with a text that ran . . . *πάσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά, καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη περὶ τὰ πρακτά, ταῦτα δ' ἐσχάτα*, and with a note containing the second argument above, he should have deleted *καὶ γὰρ-ἐσχάτα*, inserting instead the second argument as contained in the note, but introducing the *γὰρ* of the deleted words into the second argument, thus producing a text that would run . . . *πάσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον. ἐν μὲν <γὰρ> τῷ κριτικῷ εἶναι . . .*⁵

This, however, is rather speculative, although it is the type of speculation that a modern editor will necessarily have to engage in when deciding how to present his text: my main aim in this note has been to suggest that whether the second argument was in fact written by Aristotle himself or not, and whether it was intended by him to replace the first or not, 1143a29-33, *καὶ ἐν-τὰ πρακτά, does* constitute a second argument for Aristotle's thesis that the three faculties he mentions are concerned with particulars (and hence may fairly be said to 'converge to the same point'); and that this argument is an addition that has crept into the text in the wrong place.⁶

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⁵ Compare *De An.* 428a19-24. Some commentators, e.g. Ross (287) and Theiler (137), accept Torstrik's suggestion (173) that the passage contains two versions of a single argument, and that (a19) *ἀλλὰ-πολλοῖς* (a22) is the later version, (a22) *ἐπι-δ' οὐ* (a24) being the earlier one. They therefore indicate in their texts that *ἐπι-δ' οὐ* should not be considered. Others, however, e.g. Rodier (ii 422), Hicks (464) and Hamlyn (132), seeing that *ἐπι-δ' οὐ* makes an additional point, take these lines to be the later version; but believing the two arguments to be sufficiently distinct for both to be in place, they reject Torstrik's suggestion of a single argument. However, since (a20) *οὐκ ἐνδέχεται-πιστεύειν* (a21) seems to be mere explanation of the meaning of the preceding *ἐπεταί*, the argument of *ἀλλὰ-πολλοῖς* may fairly be said to be totally absorbed by that of *ἐπι-δ' οὐ*, which in addition makes a real further step by going from *πειθῶ* to *λόγος*. If this is correct, may we not wish to prefer a conflation of the two views mentioned, saying (a) that *ἐπι-δ' οὐ*, or rather: (a22) *πάση-δ' οὐ* (a24), is the later version; (b) that it was intended by Aristotle to *replace* *ἀλλὰ-πολλοῖς*, with *ἀλλὰ* being inserted into the new version from the old one, and (c) that an editor, instead of complying with Aristotle's intention, inserted the new version into the text he found by means of an *ἐπι*, thus producing our text?

⁶ I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen, University of Copenhagen, and J. L. Ackrill, Jonathan Barnes and Lesley Brown, Oxford, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this note.

Who was Diogenes of Oenoanda?*

(PLATES VII, VIIIa)

Many citizens of Oenanda are named 'Diogenes' on inscriptions surviving there from the Roman period,¹ yet

* I wish to thank Dr Stephen Mitchell, who read an earlier draft of this Note, for saving me from several errors. Any which remain are my own.

¹ A full list will be given in a forthcoming article in *Anatolian Studies*.

the most famous of them all, who gave his name to the vast Epicurean treatise now lying in fragments across the northern part of the site,² has still to be securely identified.

Those who have studied Diogenes' treatise do not agree on a date for the setting-up of the inscription. C. W. Chilton followed most earlier scholars in accepting a date 'about A.D. 200',³ but M. F. Smith, who has devoted great efforts in recent years to the recovery and study of the text, has found reasons for proposing a date as early as Hadrianic times.⁴

The text so far recovered contains some biographical details concerning D.'s age and health, but nothing which establishes precise dates for his birth and death, nor family connections:

Fr. 55 (Teubner, ed. Chilton) *Πολλάκις, ὠ νεοί, | νῆ τὸν Ἡρακλέα | καὶ ἡγανάκτησα | πρὸς τοὺς οὐδέτω | μέγ γεγηρ[α]κ[ό]τας | [---*

Fr. 50 (Chilton) *Διογένης τοῖς συγγενέσι | καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις τά/θε ἐντέλλομαι | νοσῶν οὕτως ὥστε μοι νῦ[ν] | τῆν τοῦ ζῆν ἐτι ἡ μηκέτι[ι] | ζῆν ὑπάρχειν κρίσιν — | καρδιακὸν γὰρ με διαφορεῖ πάθος —, ἂν μὲν διαγέ/νωμαι, διδόμενον ἐτι | μοι τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως λήμψ[ο]μαι . . .*

Thus the author was elderly and ill—however we may wish to interpret *καρδιακὸν πάθος*—but it does not follow that this illness led to his immediate death.

We must, therefore, seek some prominent citizen of O. who had reached middle age between late Hadrianic times and the end of the Severan Era. This philosophically inclined D. will have been rich and influential, since only a leading citizen could have built or bought the building ('the stoa', he calls it—Fr. 2 v.12)⁵ which displayed his treatise. I shall consider two possible identifications, one some time in the field, the other new.

I

In his 1960 edition of the Fragments,⁶ A. Grilli proposed that the Epicurean D. should be identified with Flavianus D., kinsman of a Licinnia Flavilla who erected at O., at some date early in the third century A.D., a large mausoleum (now in ruins),⁷ upon whose façade was inscribed a detailed genealogy of her family, carried back twelve generations, and claiming a Spartan ancestor, Cleander, the alleged founder of the neighbouring city of Kibyra. The genealogy of Flavilla,⁸ although incomplete, is the second longest inscription at O., and Grilli's proposal that 'her relative Diogenes', whom she associates with herself in the heading of the inscription, was also responsible for the Treatise, which is, by any of several reckonings, one of the largest inscriptions surviving from the Ancient World, is persuasive if not conclusive, and is well discussed by Chilton.⁹ The difficulties involved in accepting this identification are considered below.

² For the position of the fragments, see Fig. 3 (p. 195) of 'The Oenoanda survey: 1974-76', *Anat. St.* xxvi (1976) 191-7. The implications are discussed on 194 and 196.

³ C. W. Chilton, *Diogenes of Oenoanda. The Fragments*. (1971) *Introd.* p. xx.

⁴ M. F. Smith, 'Oenoanda: The Epicurean Inscription', *Acta of the Tenth International Congress of Classical Archaeology* (Ankara 1978) 841-7.

⁵ See now D. Clay, 'Philippson's "Basilica" and Diogenes' Stoa', *AJP* cxix (1978) 120-3, in which the alleged reference to a 'basilica' in Diogenes *fr.* 51 is shown to be the metaphorical use of a medical term, *βασιλικόν*.

⁶ A. Grilli, *Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta* (Milan 1960) 20.

⁷ Marked on Fig. 2, opp. p. 192, of 'The Oenoanda survey: 1974-76' (n. 2 above) in Area Lr.

⁸ *IGR* iii 500.

⁹ Chilton, *op. cit.* (n. 3) xx-xxi.